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I
The system of Advaita can be identified by four doctrines which are integrally connected with one another. They are: 1. the doctrine of Nirguna- Brahman, 2. the doctrine of vivarta, 3. the doctrine of anirvacaniya-khyati and 4. the doctrine of jivan-mukti. Anyone
who subscribes to these doctrines is an Advaitin. Though there are differences among the Advaitins in the enunciation of the several views connected with these doctrines, they unreservedly accept these basic
doctrines, which remain the same in the tradition of Advaita from the time of the Upanishads down to the present time even though we speak of pre-Shankara, post-Shankara, and contemporary Advaita subjecting what
transcends time to a time span. Jnaneshvara (13th century AD), the philosopher-saint of Maharashtra, belongs to the main stream of Advaita which flows from the Upanishads. The basic doctrines of Advaita can he
derived from the Chandogya text, 6.2.1, which says, "Being alone, my child, was this in the beginning, one only without a second." The Upanishads speak of the reality as Sat, as Brahman, as Atman.
It is called Sat in the sense that it is Being, mere existence, mere esse – subtle, indefinable, all-pervading. It is called Brahman because it is big, infinite. It is also known as Atman because it
constitutes the nature (svarupa) of everything; also it is that which pervades all bodies. This reality is described elsewhere in the Upanishad as not only real (satyam) and infinite (anantam), but also as knowledge (jnanam) lest
it should be confused with the prakrti of Sankhya, which is insentient (jada) even though it is said to be real and infinite.
The Chandogya text mentioned above presents the metaphysical problem of the one and the many in a paradoxical way. Pointing to the pluralistic
universe, the manifested universe characterised by name, form, and change, as "this" (idam), the text identifies it with Being in its unmanifested form, because it declares that in the beginning
before creation it was Being alone, while emphasizing at the same time that Being is bereft of plurality on the ground that it is one only without a second. The question is whether an entity which is one can also be
many. It may appear that there is no difficulty for an entity to be both one and many. Consider, for example, a tree which is a one-many; it is one as a tree and also many as it is a differentiated entity containing
many parts such as the root system, trunk, branches, and so on which are different from one another. However, Being which we are considering is not a differentiated entity like a tree. It is not a whole consisting
of parts. Nor is it a substance possessing attributes. That is why the Upanishad says that it is "one only without a second" (ekam eva advitiyam). The three words in this expression are intended to
convey that Being is free from three kinds of difference – sajatya-bheda, vijatiya-bheda, and svagata-bheda. For example, two trees which belong to the same class may be different from each other, that
is to say, there is sajatya-bheda between them. There is vijatiya-bheda between a tree and a stone because they belong to two different classes. There is svagata-bheda in a tree which is made up
of different parts. But Being is totally different from other objects: there is nothing similar or dissimilar to it; nor does it admit of internal differentiation. It follows that Being which is one without a second
cannot be a onemany. Though the many, i.e., the pluralistic universe, is related to the one, the latter remains unaffected by it as the non-dual entity, homogeneous and immutable. How the one appears as the many is
the problematic involving both metaphysical and epistemological issues. It is through the paradox of identifying the many with the one that the Chandogya text raises metaphysical and epistemological issues.
Hence its importance for Advaita.
The four doctrines of Advaita mentioned earlier can be derived from this Chandogya text. We have already said that Being is identical with
Brahman or Atman. An entity which is non-dual cannot be but Nirguna. That is why Advaita holds that Brahman, the non-dual reality, is Nirguna. Further, it is a matter of common experience that a
material entity is subject to modification, and an entity which is subject to modification is Saguna. But Brahman which is knowledge by nature is Nirguna; and so it is immutable (Avikari). Since
it is not subject to change, it cannot be the cause of the world through Parinama, but only through Vivarta. The theory of Vivarta which Advaita advocates is integrally connected with the
doctrine of Nirguna-Brahman. In order to explain the causal relation between the immutable Brahman and the manifested world, there is the need to bring in an additional factor which is called Maya or Avidya whose
ontological status is neither real nor non-real. Being a projection of such an entity, the manifested world is also characterised as neither real nor unreal, i.e. anin acaniya which means indescribable as real or as non-real. So Advaita formulates the doctrine of anirvacaniya-khyati, which
is both epistemological and metaphysical in character. If Brahman is the sole reality, if it is ever free and never bound, and if it is no other than the Atman of the jiva, then the suffering of the jiva in
empirical existence is due to Avidya. Since the saving knowledge which is capable of destroying ignorance can be attained here in this life, Advaita advocates the doctrine of liberation-in-life (jivan-mukti). Thus,
all the four basic doctrines of Advaita can be derived from the Chandogya text mentioned above.
II
Jnaneshvara subscribes to all the four doctrines of Advaita. He holds that Brahman is Nirguna. Brahman cannot be characterised as
such-and-such because it does not possess any quality or specification. Even the statement (1) that it is "real, knowledge, infinite" which is called the svarupalaksana of Brahman does not tell us what it is even
though it is the best possible definition that is available to us. Like Shankara, Jnaneshvara also tells us that this statement should be interpreted negatively and not positively (2). Brahman is called real (satyam) in order to differentiate it from things which are not real (anrita); it
is called knowledge (jnanam) in order to differentiate it from things which are material (jada); it is called infinite (anantam) in order to mark it off from things which are finite (paricchinna); and
it is called bliss (ananda) in order to distinguish it from things which are sources of pain (duhkha).
There are two reasons for saying that Jnaneshvara upholds Brahma-vivarta-vada as against Brahma-parinama-vada. The first reason is that
Brahman, without undergoing any change, is the cause of the many; and this will he possible only one the basis of vivarta. As Jnaneshvara puts it, "Wherever He becomes the many, He really becomes
nothing; and yet, without becoming anything, He is everything."(3) The language of Jnaneshvara, it should be noted, is paradoxical, Brahman is everything in the world as declared by the Upanisad; and yet it is nothing as it remains the same, the non-dual, imperative reality. The point which Jnaneshvara wants to drive home here is that, remaining what it is, Brahman serves as the ground or substratum (adhisthana) for
the appearance of the world of plurality. So Brahman and the world are related as the ground and the grounded, the substratum and the superimposed, reality and appearance. The second reason for saying that
Jnaneshvara is an advocate of the theory of vivarta is connected with the relation between Brahman and the world. While cause and effect have the same ontological status (sama-satta) in the case of parinama, they have different ontological status (visama-satta) in vivarta. Consider
clay and pot which are related as cause and effect. Here clay is the cause of pot through parinama. Both of them have empirically reality (vyavaharika-satta); and so they have the same ontological
status. But in the case of the rope-snake example in which rope is the transfigurative material cause (vivartopadana-karana) of snake, they have different ontological status; for, while rope has empirical
reality, snake has phenomenal reality (pratibhasika-satta). They are passages in the writings of Jnaneshvara in support of this position. For example, using the significant expression "jagadabhasa" (world-appearance)
he says that "Lord Vatesha hides Himself and shows the world-appearance; and then He swallows it by manifesting Himself".(4) Again, clarifying the nature of Brahman in relation to the appearance and disappearance of the world, he says: "Whenever He is manifest, the world disappears, and whenever He is veiled, it makes its appearance. (The truth is) He is neither manifest nor hidden, remaining untouched or unaffected (by both the presses of manifesting and hiding)".(5) It is well known in the case of rope-snake example that, when the snake is seen, the rope remains concealed and that, when the rope is seen, there is no more the appearance of the snake. Such a situation arises in the case of appearance and reality. What is true of the rope and the snake is true of Brahman and the world.
The world which is an appearance (abhasa) is neither real (sat) not non-real (asat). That which exists all the time, that which is
not subject to sublimation (badha) is real. Since Brahman alone fulfils this criterion, it alone is real. What is non-real is totally non-existent. For example, "sky-flower" which is never
experienced by anyone at anytime is non-real. There is neither cognition (pratiti) nor sublimation (badha) for it. But the world is not real because it exists and disappears; that is to say, it suffers
sublimation, and so it is not real (badhyamanantvat na sat). Nor is it non-real because it is cognised (pratiyamanatvat na sat). Since it is neither real like Brahman nor non-real like sky-flower,
Advaita characterises it as indescribable (anirvacaniya). What appears and disappears, like the rope-snake, has a peculiar ontological status. It is a "third category" different from the real and
the non-real. Advaita rejects the argument that a given entity must be either real or non-real and that the admission of a "third category" which is neither real nor non-real violates the law of excluded
middle. It is experience that provides the directive principle for logic and not the other way. The need for the admission of the "third category" arises because of experience. Logic cannot legislate for
experience. On the contrary, it has to conform to and accommodate experience. So Advaita holds that the world-appearance, which has empirical reality and which can not, therefore, be ignored is illusory (mithya), an illusory appearance (mithyavabhasa). To
say that the world has empirical reality amounts to saying that it is an appearance. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Advaitin advocates anirvacaniyakhyati in his epistemology and metaphysics. In
this commentary on the Bhagavad-Gita, 7.4, Jnaneshvara says that the eightfold prakrti of the Lord is His Maya(6). Again, commenting on the Gita text, 13.12, he says that the supreme
cannot he said to be non-existent (asat) because it is manifest in the form of the world. From this one should rush to the conclusion that the universe is the supreme Self, because it is His Maya (7). In other words, the world being a
projection of Maya is anirvacaniya.
The jiva in its essential nature is Brahman itself. Since Brahman is ever free and never bound, the Self in the jiva is always free. The jiva must
realise that it is not the body, or the senses, or the mind, but the Atman which is no other than Brahman. The help of the Word, the Upanishadic text is needed to realise one's Self. In the words of Jnaneshvara,
"When a thing is lost to us or to others in forgetfulness, it is regained by the Word that reminds it."(8) If entanglement in the body is bondage, disentanglement from it is freedom. The word helps the jiva to realise its Self even as it is tenanting the body; and this Self-realisation is jivan-mukti. As
Jnaneshvara puts it, "The Word sets free the finite Self entangled in the body. The Atman meets Himself by means of the World."(9)
III
Shankara and Jnaneshvara in their commentaries on the thirteenth chapter of the Bhagavadgita, which deals with ksetra and ksetrajna, raise
quite a few epistemological and metaphysical issues connected with Being and beings. The word "ksetra" means field, and "ksetrajna" means the knower of the field. Every system of
philosophy inquires into certain categories which are viewed as ultimate. The Nyaya-Vaisesika system, for example, accepts seven categories, six positive and one negative, which cover the whole of reality. Sankhya,
on the other hand, develops its philosophy on the basis of only two categories. Unlike Nyaya-Vaisesika which is pluralistic and Sankhya which is dualistic, Advaita is non-dualistic because it accepts only one
reality, Brahman or the Self. Though its aim is to inquire into Brahman, it accepts only one reality, Brahman or the Self. Though its aim is to inquire into Brahman, it cannot and does not straight away start its
inquiry with Brahman. It starts with the lived experience, the life-world of the jiva, in order to discover the reality which is immanent it. In other words, Brahman-in-the-world is the starting point of
philosophical inquiry; and Brahman which is mixed up with the world can be distinguished from the world through inquiry. The distinction between Brahman and the world is so sharp, so fundamental" that it
requires another pair of worlds, the Self and the non-Self, to highlight their antithesis. Shankara uses the worlds "asmad" and 'yusmad", which are freely translated as the subject and
the object respectively, to convey their antithetical nature. The epistemological and metaphysical inquiry, usually called pramana-prameyavicara, which Advaita undertakes like any other system, starts with
the dichotomy between the Self and the non-Self, between the subject and the object, even though Advaita is non-dualistic. Shankara justifies this procedure on the ground that the worldly life (loka-vyavahara), the
lived experience of every jiva, is carried on by identifying the Self and the not-Self, the subject and the object, even though such an identification is untenable. In the words of Shankara:
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object
and the subject whose respective spheres are the notion of the "Thou" and the "I" and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified.. In spite of this, it is quite natural to the human being, because of wrong knowledge, not to distinguish the two entities (viz. the object and the subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely different, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus coupling the real and the unreal, to make use of expressions such as "That I am" and "That is mine". (10)
Jnanadeva points out that the acceptance of dualism at the commencement of the inquiry is only provisional. Commenting on the Gita text, 13.13, which says,
With hands and feet everywhere, with eyes, heads, and mouths everywhere, with ears hearing everywhere, it
(Brahman) exists pervading all.
Jnaneshvara says that, though Brahman has o forms, scripture describes it as having forms, as pervading everything through its organs, employing the
language of dualism in order to convey the truth of non-duality. In the words of Jnaneshvara:
Because of its omnipresence we have described it in this way; otherwise, how can we speak of it which is devoid of all forms as
having hands, feet, and eyes? When
a wave rises in the sea and swallows another small wave, it is the swallowing wave different from the swallowed wave (both being water)? In the same way as Brahman is the same everywhere, how can it possess dualism as the pervader and the pervaded? But in order to explain what it is, it has become necessary to adopt the notion of dualism. Just a small dot is used to denote zero, the language of duality has to be used in expounding oneness. Otherwise... the institution like the preceptor and the disciple (in which instruction is imparted by the former to the latter) will cease to exist, and all talk about oneness will come to an end. It is for this reason that the Vedas have adopted the language of dualism to expound the truth of non-dualism. (11)
The distinction between ksetrajna and ksetra is the distinction between the Self and the not-Self, between the subject and the object.
The term "ksetra" is comprehensive enough to include everything other than the Self. As Jnaneshvara puts it, "All things in this world with the exception of the supreme Self take birth and die
and constitute this field."(12) All these things are objects, while the Self or ksetrajna alone is the subject. If Brahman or the Self is Being, the objects can be called "beings"
in the sense that whatever existence they have is derived from Being. The non-dual reality which transcends the knower-known distinction gets divided as it were, through some "shaking" or
"throbbing", what Jnaneshvara calls "ksobha" or "sphurti", into the knower and the known. In the words of Jnaneshvara:
Untouched by pleasure and pain, He Himself stands in
front of Himself by momentarily exploding in to this form (of the world, of the object).
That (explosion) is named as the becoming of the seen (i.e., the phenomenal world). Just as the reflectedness of the reflected
object is due to its reflection, (likewise) serness is attributed to the pure consciousness by it (i.e. by the explosion). (13)
It may be noted that the pure consciousness becomes the seer in the presence of the seen. In the absence of the seen, it cannot be called the seer,
because the seer and the seen are relative terms. Both Shankara and Jnaneshvara consider the knowledge of the distinction between the field and the knower of the field to be important for the correct understanding
of Brahman because it comprehends everything worth knowing and there is nothing else to be known apart from these two. That is why Krishna says: "To know the field and the knower of the field, I deem it as the knowledge". (14)
IV
Some important epistemological and metaphysical issues are raised by both Shankara and Jnaneshvara during the discussion of the nature of ksetra and ksetrajna. According
to Jnaneshvara, Krishna's teaching centres round four aspects of Brahman – ksetra, Jnana, jneya and ajnana (vv, 518).(15) It is only for further elucidation that Krishna proceeds to discuss about Purusa and Prakrti, the
cause of bondage, and the four paths to liberation in the reminder (vv. 19-34). Shankara too has identified the same issues in his commentary. Both of them show the same linkage with the ideas in the earlier
chapters, wherever necessary.
The objective world which is called ksetra is the product of prakrti or Maya which has a dependent existence according to Advaita,
Brahman, through prakrti or Maya, is the cause of the world. Making a distinction between two kinds of upadana-karana, Advaita holds that, while Maya is the transformative material cause (parinamyupadana-karana). Brahman
is the transfigurative material cause (vivartopadana-karana). In the course of his commentary on the Gita text, 7.6, Jnaneshvara says that prakrti which lays out the manifold name and form is a
"reflection" of Brahman and "nothing else",(16) and so Brahman alone is the origin and dissolution of the universe. Again, commenting on the text, 7.13, he says that Maya, consisting of three gunas, is
Brahman's "reflection and shadow" and that it acts as a veil hiding the true nature of Brahman.(17) Explaining why the beings of the world find it difficult to recognise the Lord (7,13), he says:
The beings created by me do not know me and are not in
me, just as pearls produced form water do not get dissolved in water. The pot made out of clay mixes into it easily, but does not do so when baked in fire; so all the creatures are truly my limbs and have come into being through the play of my Maya.
So, though they belong to me, they are not the Se1f and do not recognise me and have become blinded by sense-objects and deluded by the notions of "I" and "mine".(18)
The expression used by Jnaneshvara to bring out the nature of Maya shows that Maya which is dependent on Brahman is not identical with
it. He characterises Maya as Brahman's "reflection and shadow". A reflection or shadow has no reality of its own; even so, day has no reality of its own. The beings of the world projected by Maya belongs
to the Self, because Maya which is their source belongs to it. But neither Maya nor the beings of the world are the Self. In short, the entire not-Self – the ksetra comprising the great
elements, egoism, intellect, and the Unmanifest, the ten senses and the mind, and the five objects of the senses, the qualities or states of the mind such as desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, intelligence and courage,
and the aggregate of the body and the senses – is neither real nor non-real, and belongs to the third category which is anirvacaniya. It may be noted here that, according to both Shankara and Jnaneshvara,
desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, intelligence and courage are not the characteristics of the Self as maintained by the Vaisesikas, but of the mind. Being objects of knowledge, they are knowable and are,
therefore, not-Self: while the Self is the seer (drasta), the non-Self is the seen (drsya).
The seer-seen problem calls for a brief excursus at this stage. How can Advaita, one may ask, bring in the seer-seen dualism while it upholds the
thesis of non-dualism? Though Advaita is non-dualistic in its metaphysics, it is realistic in its epistemology. The minimum claim of realism in its epistemology is that there is such a thing called cognition.
Starting with the minimum claim, it gradually enlarges its scope to accommodate two more factors. Ordinarily we do not come across bare cognition. Cognition is always cognition of something. In other words, it is
transitive pointing to an object. Again, cognition is always cognition of someone; it belongs to some person. It means that cognition is two-way relational involving contact with the subject on the one hand and an
object on the other. Cognition, cogniser, and cognised are the three factors (triputi) involved in a knowledge situation as it takes place in the waking and in dream experience. The non-dual consciousness is
split into two – the seer and the seen – or into three – the seer, the seen, and seeing, by Avidya. To quote Jnaneshvara: "Hence, due to the work of Avidya, there is the seen-seerness. That I do
not know. It exists like this only without beginning." Again, he says: "In the same way, it (i.e. pure consciousness) itself goes on showing the seen within itself to itself; thereby, it displays this
trinity of the seer-seen-sight."(20) What Jnaneshvara wants to convey here is this: "how the subject-object dualism, which is due to the work of Avidya, arises is beyond our understanding.
Since Avidya is beginningless, the subject-object dualism is equally beginningless. The pure consciousness which transcends the seer-seen distinction remains unaffected by it. However, in our day-to-day life
in which we transact all kinds of business we develop "I-cognition" (aham pratyaya) and "this cognition" (idam pratyaya) consequent on the reflection of consciousness in the
internal organ which is a product of Avidya". His conclusion is:
Thus, the one (pure consciousness) alone has become the three (i.e. seer, seen, and sight). On the
disappearance of the three, the one alone remains. Hence, the three is only an illusion and oneness alone is the reality. (21)
The standpoint of Jnaneshvara is the same as that of Shankara. In the course of his commentary on the Gita text, 14.2, Shankara observes:
It is only by a figure of speech that the Self, the immutable consciousness, is spoken of as the cognizer,
just as, in virtue of its heat, fire is said, by a figure of speech, to do the act of heating.. the lord has taught us that the Self has in itself no concern with action, or with its accessories, or with its results, that they are imputed to the Self by Avidya, and
that they are, therefore, said to belong to the Self only by figure of speech.
V
Both Shankara and Jnaneshvara hold that liberation can be attained only by knowledge. While Shankara's explanation of what one gains by knowledge is
brief, Jnaneshvara is eloquent in his description of the post-knowledge situation. This is what Shankara says about the fruit of knowledge: "The end of this knowledge is moksa, the cessation of mortal existence, of samsara".(22) Jnaneshvara's description of the fruit of knowledge is as follows:
This knowledge destroys ignorance and brings about the
union of the embodied Self with the supreme Self. It closes the doors of the senses, diminishes activity, and dispels anxiety of the mind. With the attainment of this knowledge, the sense-duality disappears, and the Self realises its identity with the supreme Self. This knowledge destroys the ego, devours the great delusion, and banishes all talk of "mine" and "others". It uproots worldly existence, cleanses the impurity of desire, and embraces the all-pervading Brahman. (23)
How do we know, one may ask, that a person has attained the saving knowledge? Though no one has direct access to the saving knowledge attained by a
person, it can be inferred by a close observation of the behaviour of the jnani. This is what Jnaneshvara means when he declares that "it can be seen by the physical eye". To quote Jnaneshvara:
It is not true that it cannot be seen by the physical eyes. For, when the body becomes permeated by the power
of this knowledge, its symptoms become visible through the actions of the sense organs. Just as the blossoming of the trees indicates the advent of the spring, so the actions of sense organs bear testimony to knowledge. (24)
Though the final knowledge cannot be described as it transcends subject-object duality, the behaviour of one who possesses this knowledge, variously
described as sthitaprajna, brahma-nistha, jnani, jivan-mukta, and so on, can be described. That is why Arjuna asks Krishna elsewhere how a sthitaprajna would speak, sit, and move about;(25) and Krishna's description of the behaviour of a sthitaprajna in
response to Arjuna's question has become a classic. Jnaneshvara is of the view that once again Krishna enumerates a series of characteristics (13,7-11) such as absence of pride and hypocrisy, non-injury, and so on,
which reveal the presence of the liberating knowledge in a person. His explanation of each one of these characteristics with a number of similes apt and suggestive, sayings well-tested in experience, and arguments
simple and convincing, is brilliant. It is necessary to point out in this connection that Jnaneshvara's view of these characteristics is different from that of Shankara's. The Gita text, 13-11, after
mentioning the characteristics beginning from "humility" (amanitvam) and ending with "perception of the end of the knowledge of truth" (tattvajnanartha-darsanam) says that
"this (list of characteristics) is declared to be knowledge, and what is opposed to it is ignorance."(26) Since it is not right to say that the characteristics such as humility are knowledge, Shankara is of the view that they are said to be knowledge because they are conducive to the origination of knowledge. It follows that the opposite set of characteristics constitute ignorance, because it leads to the perpetuation of bondage. Jnaneshvara, too, is aware of the difficulty in calling humility and other characteristics as knowledge and so he says that they are the external marks of knowledge which one has attained. A person who is ignorant will reveal the opposite features such as pride, hypocrisy, and so on.
VI
The objective world consisting of beings of all sorts collectively called the field can be known through perception and other pramanas. Of the six pramanas accepted
by the Advaitin, the remaining sources of knowledge, excepting sruti, viz. perception, inference, comparison, postulation, and non-cognition are needed for knowing the objects of the world. More than one pramana is required because some objects can be known through perception (pratyaksa) and some can be known only through inference (anumana) and postulation (arthapatti); while the knowledge of similarity (sadrsya-jijna) can
be obtained only through comparison (upamana), the knowledge of the non-existence of a thing (abhava-jnana) can be obtained only though non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Sruti is of no use with
regard to things empirical. It is required only with regard to Brahman which is trans-empirical. The Advaitin holds that there is a functional arrangement called pramana-vyavastha in the operation of the pramanas. While pramanas other than sruti have
their functional scope restricted to things empirical, sruti which is scriptural authority has its operational sphere confined to the trans-empirical reality. It means that there is no contradiction (virodha) between sruti and
the other pramanas. A scriptural text which says that fire is cold and that ice is hot is not authoritative in the same way as perception and other vyavaharika-pramanas are not valid when they speak
about Brahman, the trans-empirical reality. The Advaitin, therefore, insists on the principle of demarcation between sruti on the one hand the other pramanas on the other.
If sruti is the pramana through which Brahman is known, then the latter becomes an object of knowledge (jneya), a position which
contradicts the earlier view that Brahman or the Self which is ksetrajna is the knower (jnata) or the subject. If it is the subject, one may argue, it cannot be the objet. Thus it becomes necessary for
the Advaitin to clarify whether Brahman is the subject or the object. We have already stated quoting the authority of both Shankara and Jnaneshvara that Brahman or the Self which is of the nature of consciousness
gets divided, as it were, into the subject and the object due to Avidya. It means that the status of a subject or a knower (jnatrtva) is superimposed on it due to Avidya, Veiled as it is in the
state of Avidya, it remains unknown though it is eternally present as the inward consciousness; and it can be known by the purified mind (samskrta-manasa) with the help of the Word or the Upanishadic
text. It is, therefore, said to be an object of knowledge. That is why there is the sruti text which says: "Only through the mind (Brahman) can be attained." (27) There is also the sutra which says: "Scripture is the means of the knowledge (of Brahman)".(28) It is against this background that we should understand Krishna's declaration:
A new problem arises when the text says that Brahman, the knowable, cannot be spoken of as either existent or non-existent. Shankara examines at length
several possible objections in this regard. There is first of all the objection that, if Brahman, the knowable, cannot be spoken of as existing, then it does not exist, because whatever is knowable is existent and
what is existent alone is knowable. It is true that the text says that Brahman cannot be spoken of as non-existent. Even then, this averment of the text does not solve the problem. If we cannot say that it is not
non-existent, then we have to say that it is existent, a position which is denied by the text.
The objection may be reformulated in order to show how serious the difficulty is arising from the self-contradictory standpoint of the text. There are
only two kinds of cognition – cognition of something as existent (sad-buddhi) or cognition of something as non-existent (asad-buddhi). For example, we say that a pot is existent: here, the
pot-cognition is a case of sad-buddhi. Also, we say that a sky-flower is non-existent: here, the sky-flower-cognition is a case of asad-buddhi. In a given situation we develop either sad-buddhi or asad-buddhi; and
since it is not possible to have the cognition of something as both existent and non-existent at the same time, we are compelled to say that Brahman, the knowable, must be an object of either sad-buddhi or asad-buddhi. If
the former, then we can say that it is existent; if the latter, then it is non-existent. If so, ignoring the two alternatives which alone are available, how can the text, so the objection goes, go in for the third
alternative and say that Brahman cannot be spoken of as existent or non-existent. Shankara argues that this objection is untenable as it proceeds on the wrong assumption that Brahman, which is said to be knowable,
is on a par with empirical objects like pot, which are knowable. In the case of objects such as pot, which can be perceived by the senses (indriya-gamyam), we do have the cognition of it as existent or
non-existent as the case may. But Brahman does not fall within the scope of the senses, It can be known only through the Word, the sruti text. When a pot is the object of sad-buddhi, we say that it is existent; and when it is the object of asad-buddhi, we say that it is non-existent. Since Brahman is not the object of sad-buddhi, we cannot say that it is sat; and since it is not the object of asad-buddhi, we
cannot say that it is asat. It does not follow from this that Brahman, the ground of the entire universe, does not exist. Such a conclusion will go against not only the Chandogya text with which the
present discussion has started, but other texts as well. The point which Shankara wants to drive home here is the contrast between objects which are determined by space, time, and cause and which have only empirical
reality and Brahman which transcends space, time, and cause and which is, therefore, ever existent. He objects to the extension of the logic of the finite to the infinite on the ground that, while the former fall
within the reach of buddhi, the latter does not,
There is the objection that it is a self-contradiction to say that Brahman is knowable, but at the same time it cannot be said to be sat or asat: that
is to say, what is knowable must be one of these two; and what is neither is not knowable. This objection too, says Shankara, is untenable. Strictly speaking, Brahman is not knowable. Brahman is knowledge by its
very nature; and "knowability" is superimposed on it in the state of Avidya. In support of this Shankara cites the sruti text which says: "That (Brahman) is surely different from the
known and also different from the unknown."" Expressions such as "known" and "unknown" which we use in our ordinary discourse have no application with regard to Brahman, because it is
knowledge by its very nature; and jnanam is totality different from jneyam. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the Gita text in the correct perspective.
There is yet another way by which Shankara tries to justify why Brahman cannot be said to be sat or asat. Shankara argues that the nature
of language is such that it cannot signify or reveal the nature of the non-dual Brahman. Every word that we use in our ordinary language is intended to denote a thing which belongs to a class (jati), or which possesses a quality (guna), or which is involved in action (karma), or which has a relation (sambandha) with
something else. It means that language operates only in the sphere of duality; and the object which can be signified by a word is structurally, functionally, and relationally dualistic. There is a built-in
limitation with regard to both language and object, which has to be taken note of. For example, the word "cow" signifies an animal which belongs to the class of "cowness". The word
"white" signifies a quality of an object. The word "cook" means a person who performs the act of cooking. The word "wealthy" means a person who possesses wealth. So Shankara concludes:
Brahman belongs to no class. So it cannot be signified by such words as sat.It possesses no
qualities. If it were in possession of qualities, then it could be signified by a word meaning a quality. Since it is devoid of action, it cannot be indicated by a word implying an act. The sruti says:
"It is without parts, actionless, and tranquil."(31) It is not related to
anything else, for it is one' it is without a second; it is not an object; and it is the very Self. Hence it is but right to say that it cannot be signified by any word. And the scriptural texts such as "Whence (unable to reach Brahman) speech returns"(32) convey the same idea. (33)
Wittgenstein echoes Shankara when he says: "The boundaries of my language are the boundaries of the world."(34) The metaphysical subject, viz. Brahman, is not in the world; it does not belong to the world. It is the border of the world; it is outside the world.(35) One cannot say what does not exist in the world. So the language of dualism is inadequate to express what is trans-worldly and therefore trans-linguistic.
According to Jnaneshvara, Brahman is not jneya in the usual sense of the term. The object of the world which are knowable have a beginning and
an end; and they are known by the ordinary pramanas such as perception. But Brahman, says Jnaneshvara, has neither a beginning nor an end; and it can be known only by knowledge obtained from the Upanishadic
text. Once it is known, there is nothing else to be known because it is everything. It is, therefore, jneya in a special sense. Knowability in the case of Brahman and the empirical objects is not the same.(36)
In his own characteristic way Jnaneshvara explains why we cannot say that Brahman is non-existent or existent. This is how he analyses the problem.
If you say that it is non-existent, it becomes
manifest in the form of the universe; and if you say that the universe is the supreme Self, it is only the projection of Maya. Brahman has no form, colour or
shape. It is not seen nor does it see. So, who can say that it exists and how? Well, if you say that it does not really exist, then how did the Great Principle (mahat) and the other evaluates come
into being? Since no one could say that it is or it is not, speech becomes dumb and the power of thinking too comes to a dead halt. (37)
VII
What cannot be proved by pramanas or ordinary language cannot be dismissed as a non-entity, as something which does not exist at all. Brahman,
we have already said, is beyond the reach of the senses which go outward, beyond the mind which is sullied and, therefore, gives only separate knowledge, and beyond the ordinary language which is functionally
effective only in the realm of dualism. Nevertheless, it is the ground for the appearance of the jiva and the world, ksetrajna and ksetra, the subject and the object which interact with each other such
that the jiva becomes the subject of knowledge, the agent of action, and the enjoyer of the consequences of action. There is, therefore, the need to prove the existence of Brahman. A word of caution is necessary at
this stage about the proofs or arguments for the existence of Brahman. These arguments show that, unless we presuppose the primal Being as the supporting principle of the various cognitive and conative activities of
the jiva and of the manifold changes that take place in the world of name and form, we cannot account for the well known loka-vyavahara. They do not and cannot establish the essential nature of Brahman or the
identity of jiva and Brahman, for which the help of sruti is needed. They are "transcendental" in nature in the sense that they show Brahman or the Self as the necessary condition for the
possibility of experience, action, and personal identity. As Sureshvara puts it, "Given this reality (i.e. Brahman or the Self), the 'this' (comprising the world of objects) is manifest and in its absence
nothing is manifest."(38) We notice four arguments for the existence of Brahman in the Gita text (13. 13-17). They are: (1) introspective argument (v. 15), (2) psycho-physical argument
(v. 13), (3) epistemological argument (vv. 14 and 17), and metaphysical argument (vv.15-16).
The basic doctrine that Brahman is no other than the inward Self (pratyak), which is referred to quite frequently in the text (see 13.15),
contains the introspective argument for the existence of Brahman. Everyone of us, with a little reflection, can know that a human being is a complex entity consisting of the body, the senses, and the mind. We do not
have any doubt about the body with which we perform many actions. Nor do we doubt the presence in us of the senses with which we hear the sound, feel heat and cold, perceive colours, and so on. Sometimes we say,
"I was absent-minded, and so I did not notice the presence of something", "I am mentally depressed," "I have made up my mind to do that," and so on referring to the role of the mind in
our cognitive, affective, and conative activities. Of course, we do not and cannot perceive the mind and the senses even though we perceive the gross external body. However, we know them through inference.
Cognition, desire, aversion, volition, perseverance, etc. are the states of the mind. The sense of "I" (aham) that a person develops is also associated with the mind. It is the "I" that
passes for the inward Self while the truth is that it is not. Though it is not the Self, it is a pointer to the Self which is its source. Whenever a person develops the sense of "I", she has access to the
Self. That is why Shankara declares that there is no one to whom the Self remains unknown, Ramana Maharshi exhorted his disciples to ask the question. 'Who am 'I'?" "What is the source of 'I'?" It
means that the Self is known through introspection following the process of eliminating one by one the body, the senses, and the mind. When the Gita text, 13.15, says that Brahman is "within" (antah) all beings, it refers to the inward Self (pratyagataman) which is no other than Brahman.
We will now consider the psycho-physical argument which proves the existence of the Self on the ground that it is the source of all activities of the
organs such as hands and feet. It is well known that the motion of a physical object such as a cart is due to the sentient principle. A human being pushes a cart; or, a horse pulls a carriage. Here, a human being or
a horse is a sentient being responsible for the movement of the cart which is a material thing. Ksetra is the adjunct (upadhi) of the ksetrajna. Shankara observes that ksetrajna, i.e.,
the Self, the sentient principle, is so-called because of the upadhi of ksetra, and this ksetra has different organs such as hands and feet, eyes and ears, and so on, including the mind. These
organs constituting the body of the Self perform various activities due to the energy inherent in the Self, and so they are marks (linga) of the existence of the Self. The argument may be stated in the form
of inference:
The Self Exists
Because it is conditioned by upadhis such as hands and feet like akasa which has pot as its upadhi.
Whatever is conditioned by upadhi exists.
Though the Self is one, it appears to be many because of the plurality of bodies. It is infinite; that is why the text says that the Self, which is
spoken of as the knowable, has its hands and feet, eyes, mouths, and heads everywhere. It should be borne in mind that the distinctions – structural, functional, and qualitative – in the upadhi are
superimposed on the Self.
The epistemological argument for the existence of Brahman is suggested in two verses, 12.14 and 13.17, of the Gita text. The argument as
presented in 13.14 can be viewed as metaphysical as well as epistemological in character. Both Shankara and Jnaneshvara interpret the expression "asaktarn sarvabhrt" (unattached, yet supporting all)
in a metaphysical way. In the course of his commentary on this text, Shankara observes: "Since it (i.e. the Self) is devoid of the senses, it is unattached, i.e. devoid of all attachments. Though it is so, it
supports all." The world of plurality is an appearance, and there is no appearance without reality. In the rope-snake example, it is the rope which is the reality that supports the snake which is an illusory
appearance, even though the rope has no relation with the snake. What holds good in the rope-snake example also holds good in respect of Brahman and the world. Jnaneshvara also holds the same view.
Though the relation of the supporter and the supported is undoubtedly metaphysical in character, Shankara explains it in an epistemological way. His
argument is very brief. He says: "Indeed, everything is based on the Sat, the existent; for, everywhere the cognition of 'sat' is present" (sadaspadam hi sarvarm, sarvatra sadbuddhyanugamat). He has
elaborated this argument elsewhere in his commentary (see 2.16). The argument may be elucidated in four steps.
First, we perceive every object, whatever it may be, as something existent; and we express ourselves by saying, "The pot is existent,"
"The cloth is existent," and so on. That is to say, our cognition is about the "existent pot" (san ghatah), the "existent cloth" (san patah), and so on, We cognise two
aspects of the given object, its "existence" aspect and the "form" (vikara) in which it presents itself to us, i.e. the form of the pot or of the cloth. Of these two aspects, the
"existence" aspect is uniformly present in all our cognitions, whereas the particular "form" of the object such as pot, cloth, and so on varies from cognition to cognition. That which is
uniformly present in our cognition, so Shankara argues, is real (sat); and that which is sometimes present and sometimes absent is unreal (asat). It means that the objective form which varies from
cognition to cognition is not real whereas the "existence" aspect is real.
Secondly, the sat that is cognised in every act of perception is Brahman. The existent (sat) is real (satyam), and the real is the existent. The Chandogya text (6.2.1), "Being (Sat) alone, my Dear, was its in the beginning," and the Taittiriya text
(2.1.1), "Real, knowledge, and infinite is Brahman" are the relevant scriptural authority in this regard.
We now move to the third step in the argument. If the existent is cognised in perception and if the existent is Brahman, then how is it, it may be
asked, that the world is cognised as existent? The answer is that the existence ascribed to the world is due to a false identification (tadatmya adhyasa) of the world with Brahman. Just as we speak of the
"clay-pot" (mrdghatah), even so we speak of the "existent world" (sajjagat). In both the cases, we have cause-effect relation; and in both, the effect is identified with its cause.
However, there is an important difference between the two cases. Since the cause-effect relation between clay and pot arises through parinama, i.e., modification of the cause into effect, both of them have
identical nature (salaksanya). In the other case, Brahman is the transfigurative cause (vivartopadana-karana) of the world, and so there is difference in nature (vailaksanya) between Brahman and
the world. The world appears to be existent because of Brahman, the substratum, on which it is superimposed. In other words, what belongs to Brahman is illicitly transferred to the world due to Avidya. Whereas
an ignorant man affirms the reality of the world because the world alone is existent to him one who has realised the truth declares the reality of Brahman and cognises everything as Brahman. So, any object that we
perceive as something existent is a pointer to the existence of Brahman.
We will now consider the second epistemological argument for the existence of Brahman. The Gita text, 13.17, speaks of Brahman as "the light even of lights" (jyotisamapi jyotih). Shankara's
explanation of this expression is brief. He says: "That, the knowable, is the light even of lights such as the sun. Indeed, these latter shine only when illumined by the light of the consciousness of the
Self". Jnaneshvara praises the greatness and the grandeur of the eternal inner light of the Self in a poetic language. He says:
That knowable kindles the fire, provides nectar to the
moon, and gives vision to the sun to oversee the affairs of the world. By its light the starry sky is illumined, and the sun moves at pleasure in the universe... it is the intelligence of the intellect.. it is the mind of the mind, eye of the eyes, ear of the ears, the faculty of speech of the tongue.." (39)
As it is, we do not get the form and the force of the epistemological argument both from Shankara and Jnaneshvara. It will be helpful to have a brief
look at the Upanishadic background.
To Janaka’ s question, "What is the light for man when there is no illumination of the sun and the moon, no light of the fire, no guidance of
speech?" Yajnavalkya’ s replay is: "The Self, indeed, is his light, for with the Self as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns." (40) In his commentary on this text Shankara observes:
There are three points to be noted here. First, it is through the Self that the mind and the organs of knowledge serve as the light, gave us knowledge
of the things of the world. Since they are material, they cannot by themselves reveal anything; and so they have to depend upon the Self. Second; it is through the Self that we know the mind and the senses. Third,
while the Self illumines everything starting from the mind, the Self itself isn't i11umined by anything else, for everything other than the Self is material. It is in this scene that the Self is said to be
self-luminous (svaprakasa). In brief, as a text of the Katha Upanisad says: "It shining, everything else shines."(41) The same idea is conveyed in the Gita text, 13.33, "Even as
the one sun illumines the entire world, so the ksetrajna (the one in the entire ksetra) illumines all bodies." So, our inquiry to find the ultimate source of our knowledge leads us to the Self,
"the light of lights".
The second epistemological argument which centres round the self as the revealing principle can be formulated in another way by raising the fundamental
question about the presupposition of all knowledge. Advaita hold that epistemological inquiry, which is called pramana-vicara in the Indian tradition, proceeds on the basis of two assumptions. The first one
is that there is such a thing called consciousness, otherwise called the Self, which is the basic revealing principle. The part that consciousness plays in the realm of knowledge is such that Husserl called it
"the principle of principles", what the Gita characterises using the felicitous expression as "the light of lights". There are two reasons for its importance in the entire pramana-vicara. The
first is that whatever is affirmed by it can never be denied. The second reason is that whatever is denied by it can never be accepted. We say that an object is such-and-such or that it is not such-and-such only on
the evidence of consciousness. All our affirmations and denials including the most important distinction that we make between the real (sat) and the unreal (asat) are guided by, and are dependent on,
our consciousness: they are, in the language of Shankara, buddhi-tantra. If we say that the mind and the senses are revealing principles, it is only by courtesy. Strictly speaking, they are not the sources of
knowledge on their own. Borrowing the light from consciousness, they reveal objects. Shankara's elocution of the tool of the mind and the senses vis-à-vis the Self in the generation of knowledge is helpful:
The intellect, being transparent and next to the Self easily catches the reflection of the intelligence of the Self. So even wise
men happen to identify themselves with it; next comes the manas, which catches the reflection of the Self through the intellect; then, the organs, through the contact with the manas; and
lastly the body, through the organs. Thus, the Self successively illumines with its own light the entire aggregate of body and organs. (42)
The second assumption is that there is such a thing called superimposition (adhyasa) at the back of epistemological inquiry. In the justly
famous adhyasa-bhasya, which is the introduction to his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, Shankara draws our attention to the work of adhyasa as the sine qua non of pramana-vicara through a
chain of dependent relation with pramata at one end and adhyasa at the other end, No inquiry is possible without an inquirer. In the present case the inquirer is the epistemological subject known as pramata, i.e.
knower. It is the knower who undertakes the inquiry into the sources of knowledge. In the absence of the knower no epistemologica1 enterprise, what Shankara calls pramanapravrtii, is possible. For the purpose
of epistemological enterprise, we require the organs of knowledge such as the visual sense, the auditory sense, and so on. It is well known that the five sense organs are required for perception which is the basic pramanas. Every other pramana starting
from inference is dependent on perception at some stage or other. That is why perception is accorded the primary status; it is viewed as jyesthapramana, the first among the sources of knowledge, by the pramana theorists.
So the sense organs are required for the work of perception and other pramanas. The important question here is about their location. They cannot hang in the mid-air, they require a support (adhisthana) for
their existence. And body is their support. Further, the body as such cannot come into operation unless one identifies oneself with the body: that is to say, the body, though material, must become sentient, which
will be possible only when there is identification of the Self with the body. In the absence of the mind, the senses, and the body, the Self which is unattached (asanga) cannot become pramata. It must
itself be the knower. The former which is pure consciousness requires a medium to come into relation with anything; and the latter which is material cannot be the knower. Due to the reflection or semblance of
consciousness in the internal organ, there arises what is called cidabhasa which is, strictly speaking, the knower (pramata); and the rise of a knower, therefore, requires a false identification of
consciousness with the internal organ which is its proximate adjunct. So, according to Shankara there is the need for adhyasa for epistemological inquiry. To recapitulate the several factors which are in
dependent relation; without pramata there is no pramana-pravrtti; for pramana-pravrtti, there is the need of indriyas; indriyas, again, require the body as their adhisthana; and finally, there must be adhyasa between
the Self and the body. It may be mentioned here that adhyasa is the support of the entire loka-vyavahara in which the jiva, i.e. the Self-in-the-body, plays multiple voles as the subject of knowledge,
as the agent of action, both scriptural and secular, and the enjoyer of the consequences of action, here and hereafter.
Lastly, we may consider the metaphysical argument, which can also be called the causal argument. The Gita text, 13.16 says that Brahman is the
supporter, devourer, and generator of beings. Commenting on this text, Shankara observes:
The knowable (i.e. Brahman) supports beings during sthiti, the period of sustenance of the universe; and it devours them at pralaya, i.e.
at the time of dissolution. It generates them at the time of utpatti, the origin of the universe, just as a rope gives rise to an illusory snake.
Jnaneshvara in his commentary on this text refers to Brahman very significantly as "the first cause of the universe" in order to convey that
it is both the material and efficient cause rolled into one (abhinna-nimitta-upadana-karana). The Chandogya text with which the analysis of the basic doctrines of Advaita was commenced in this paper
purports to show that Being which was "one only without a second" in the beginning is not only the material cause, but also the efficient cause. It means that Brahman, the first cause, is an intelligent
principle. In the discussion of the cause-effect relation we usually come across the clay-pot and rope-snake examples. While the former example illustrates he theory of parinama, the latter, the theory of vivarta. Advaita, as stated earlier, upholds Brahma-vivarta-vada as
against Brahma-parinama-vada advocated' by some Vedantins like Bhartrprapannca. Shankara mentions the rope-snake example in his commentary, any change in its being is the cause of the world in the same
way as a rope, without any modification whatsoever in its being, is the cause of the illusory snake. The two examples initially mentioned by Jnaneshvara in this context may, when superficially viewed, suggest that
Brahman, the first cause, is subject to change.
Just as the sea is the support of its waves, so Brahman is the support of all beings and forms. It, therefore, supports all beings
as the body supports childhood, youth, and old age. (43)
There is movement and change in the sea when waves appear therein. Likewise there are changes in the body when it is identified as that of childhood,
youth, and old age. Unlike the sea and the body, Brahman is immutable. One may, therefore, be tempted to say that the two illustrations are not apt. It is first of all necessary to correct the misunderstanding of
the two examples. Jnaneshvara has used these two examples not for the purpose of elucidating the immutability of Brahman, but for some other purpose. when we examine the cause-effect relation, we will notice that
the effect, first of all, has one existence of its own independently of its cause and that, secondly, it is non-different from its cause. These two principles, adhinatva and ananyatva, hold good both in the case of parinama and vivarta. Consider
the clay-pot example. The pot has no existence of its own, no nature of its own, independently of clay, its material cause. Also it is non-different from its cause. In the same way, the illusory snake does not
exist, and has no nature of its own, independently of its substratum, viz. the rope; also, it is not different from it. It must be borne in mind that the port, which is an effect or modification (vikara), is as much kalpita as
the rope-snake. Just as the rope is the substratum for the snake, even so clay is the substratum for the pot. The dependence of the effect on its cause is conveyed by the formula: kalpitasya adhisthanameva
svarupam. That the effect is non-different from its cause is conveyed by the formula "karya-karanayoh ananyatvam. Let us now look at the two examples given by Jnaneshvara in the light of these two
principles. The sea is said to support the waves because the waves do not exist independently of the sea and also because they are not different from it. The same logic holds good in the case of body and its
changes. In the same way Brahman supports the world, because the world is dependent on Brahman and is not different from it. Jnaneshvara employees another example in order to convey the idea of immutability of
Brahman.
Brahman remains the same without a break in all the stages of creation, just as the sky remains unaltered at
any time of the day, whether it is morning, noon, or evening. (44)
The causal argument which Advaita formulates on the basis of both day-to-day experience and scriptural authority establishes, first of all, the reality
of cause (karana-satyatvam).Effects such as pot, pan, etc. which come out clay exist only in name; they are not real. On the contrary, clay which is their material cause is real. What is true of clay is true
of any other cause. Extending the logic which holds good in the clay-pot example to the causality of the world, Advaita maintains that only Brahman, the first cause and the prime mover of the world, is real and that
everything else which is an effect is unreal. Sruti establishes the reality of Brahman by restating the causal relation as it obtains in our day-today experience. To know the cause is to know all the' effect
which have come out of it because every effect is essentially the same as its cause. This is how sruti recalls our experience, "Just as my Dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the
modification being only a name arising from speech while the truth is that it is just clay,"(45) in order to justify its thesis that format the knowledge of the One we can attain the knowledge' of all (eka-vijnanenasarva-vijnanam). Secondly, in the
process of establishing the reality of cause, Advaita is able to show how the effect is not only dependent on its cause, but also is non-different from it. Attention has already been drawn to these two principles.
It will be helpful in this connection to bear in mind three sutras. Badarayana establishes in 1.1.2 that Brahman which is "real, knowledge, infinite" is the cause of the world. He maintains in 1.4.23 that
Brahman is not only the efficient cause, but also the material cause (prakrtisca) as this alone will be in accordance without the thesis of "from the knowledge of the One to the knowledge of all"
and the illustrations such as clay-pot given in the Chandogya text. Again, he shows in 2,1.14 that the effect is non-different from its cause. Thirdly, the vivarta version of the doctrine of causality
shows in 2.1.14 that the effect is non-different from its cause. Thirdly, the vivarta version of the doctrine of causality shows that the primal cause, which is one and non-dual, is immutable even though it
serves as the ground of the world in the same way as the rope which is the substratum for the appearance of the snake remains the same all the time – before the appearance of the snake, at the time of the appearance
of the snake, and after the disappearance of the snake.
NOTES
(1) Taiairiya Upanisad, 2.1.1.
(2) See his Amritanubhava, 5.10,12,13 included in B.P. Bahirat, The Philosophy of Jnaneshvara, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, Reprinted 1993.
Hereafter. AA
(3) Cangadeva Pasasti, v.3. Text with English translation and notes by S.R.Talghatti. Hereafter CP.
(4) Ibid., V.1.
(5) Ibid., v.2
(6) See M.R. Yardi (tr.) Shri Jnaneshvara's Bhavartha Dipika. Pune Kendra: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1995, p.161. Hereafter BD.
(7) Ibid., p. 416
(8) AA, 5.67
(9) Ibid. 6.8
(10) See Shankara's introduction to his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. This introductory portion is called adhyasa-bhasya.
(11) BD, pp. 417 - 8.
(12) Ibid., p. 367
(13) CP, vv. 16-17
(14) Bhagavad-Gita, 13.2 Hereafter BG.
(15) BD, p. 162
(16) Ibid., p. 162
(17) Ibid., p. 166
(18) Ibid.
(19) CP, v.8
(20) Ibid., v.18
(21) Ibid., v18
(22) Ibid., v.25 22. See his commentary on BG, 13,11
(23) See his Commentary on BG, 13.6. BD, pp 367-8
(24) Ibid., p. 368
(25) BG, 2.54.
(26) Ibid., 13.11
(27) Katha Upanisad, 2.1.11
(28) Brahma-sutra, 1.1.3
(29) BG, 13.12
(30) Kena Upanisad, 1.4
(31) Svetasvatara Upanisad, 6.19
(32) Taittiriya Upanisad, 2.4.2
(33) Shankara’s commentary on BG, 13.12
(34) Wittgenstein, Tractatus Ligico Philosophicus, 5.6
(35) Ibid, 5.632
(36) BD, p. 416: commentary on BG, 13.12
(37) Ibid.
(38) Naiskarmya-siddhi, 1.4
(39) BD p. 421. Commentary on BG, 13.17
(40) Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4.3.6
(41) 2.2.15
(42) See Shankara’s commentary on Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4.3.7
(43) BD, p. 420. Jnaneshvara's commentary on BG, 13.16
(44) Ibid.
(45) Chandogya Upanishad, 6.1.4
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