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Tilak's Theory of Karmayoga: A Fresh Appraisal

Prof. Krishna S. Arjunwadkar
Retired Professor of Marathi, University of Bombay.

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The Tradition of Commentators of the Bhagavad-gita

The Bhagavad-gita (BG) has been a source of inspiration and veneration for large sections of Indian society presumably since the early centuries of the Christian Era and, consequently, attracting scholars of repute through centuries to interpret it the way they understood it. This in its turn increased the popularity of this text so as to inspire newer generations of scholars making fresh attempts of interpretation. The oldest available, but not necessarily the first, commentary on BG is that of Shankaracharya who has referred to earlier commentators and criticised their views at several places in a general way and on particular issues. Among the Vedantic schools, the BG is accorded a place of honour as a basic text, with two more, the Upanishads and the Brahmasutras, together called the Prasthana-trayi. Five centuries later, Jnanadeva wrote an exhaustive Marathi commentary on BG, popularly known as Jnanesvari, which is held in high esteem by Marathi-speakers and has been moulding the Marathi mind for the successive centuries. Jnanadeva's mention therein of the Bhasyakara as a guide is taken by many to imply a covert reference to Shankaracharya, despite the view being disputed by some modern scholars who would rather like to relate Jnanadeva to a Kashmirian school.

This tradition continued until, in recent times, the voluminous work of the late Bal Gangadhar Tilak, called the Gita-rahasya (GR) (1915) or Karmayoga-shastra, with its scholarly exposition of the philosophy, religion and ethics of the BG vis-a-vis the Western outlook on these subjects, persuaded the contemporary generation, fed on and influenced by English education as envisaged by Macaulay, to look at its heritage seriously and realize its worth in the context of world thought. The success of GR in laying a philosophical foundation for the activist forces of his tunes fighting for the cause of independence is immeasurable and will ever remain an object of admiration and veneration for generations to come. What adds to the greatness of this work is the fact that it is the product of Tilak's imprisonment for six long years away from his homeland - thanks to the vindictive attitude of the British which gave Tilak a chance to devote his scholarly talents to a worthy cause, undisturbed by political occupation. The only parallel case I know in the Sanskrit tradition is more than a thousand years old, viz., that of Jayantabhatta (7th c. A.D.), the author of Nyayamanjari, an encyclopaedic work on Indian logic which, on the authority of its author, was the result of his long imprisonment by a Kashmir king of his time. We should indeed thank the Kashmir king and the British for putting the two scholars into jail! Tilak's work influenced several contemporary and subsequent authors who wrote on BG from a social outlook.

Tilak's Presumptions and Conclusions

The most common feature of all writers of this class is to take personalities associated with the BG as real, historical and regard the events involving them as evidence in deciding its teaching. Thus Arjuna's reluctance before, and readiness after, the dialogue that is BG, is taken as a proof of the intention of the work to induce activism. Since, between the two points, all Upanishadic philosophy is presumed or stated succinctly, it is assumed that Arjuna had in the meantime become a jnanin - a man of realization and hence qualified for liberation as conceived by the Upanishads. The description of how Arjuna had the privilege of the exclusive vision of the all-pervading manifestation of Krishna - identified as God Almighty during the former's dialogue with the latter is considered to strengthen his claim to qualifications for liberation. The readiness of such a person to fight reveals that, in the view of BG, performance of social duties - varnasrama-dharma, to use a time-honoured term standing for the prototype of such duties - which is emphasized repeatedly and more than anything else in the course of the exposition in BG, is a must even for a man of realization, for the good and guidance of the society, i. e., for loka-samgraha, if not for personal gain, as is the case with the ordinary people. Arjuna thus followed the same path as was trodden by Krishna the God and Janaka the renowned philosopher-king of ancient times. The name given by BG to such disinterested activism is Karmayoga (KY) - a term occuring prominently in BG for the first time in the history of Indian philosophy and popularized by GR - which is its main thesis. The BG as viewed by GR is thus opposed to renunciation which has been the keynote of Vedantic tradition for centuries.

Ancient Support for a Contemporary Cause

There can be no objection to an attempt to reinterpret old texts to meet contemporary needs of a society; and it must be admitted that GR has succeeded in carrying masses with it to a preconceived goal. Tilak was a great fighter and organizer who pined Indian masses against the Britishers in a degree no one before him could. All organizations need myths (or, alternatively, common interests) to build on, and support for a cause from an ancient source goes a long way in convincing a tradition-bound society of the necessity of coming together under a single banner. 'I am not stating anything new; I am only reiterating what our past masters have revealed.' This is an attitude assumed by Indian thinkers through centuries and liked by their society in general, despite the fact that new elements did find their way to the old framework but in the guise of an extension of the old ones, although India has also produced great men who took a positively opposite attitude of replacing old values with new ones. Tilak shrewdly recognised this fact and presented his outlook as coming from an old revered work.

The Basics and the Superstructure

This is the credit and rationale of Tilak's work. From a strictly philosophical point of view, however, Tilak's theory does not satisfy the logical demands a theory has to meet in order to be accepted as viable. A theory has its basics on which it builds the superstructure; and it is naturally to be expected that the latter should be harmonious with the former. What is wanting in Tilak's theory is the harmony between its basics and superstructure. To understand this, it is necessary to state briefly the contents of these aspects of his theory of KY.

The Basics

The basics of Tilak's theory have to be found in the philosophical heritage of BG. BG is admittedly the successor of the Upanishads to such an extent that a number of verses from the latter are bodily borrowed by the former. It borrows the Advaitic concepts of the ultimate unity of the individual and the universal principles, and the concept of liberation - moksha,the highest purusartha or goal of human life, in all its distinctive features which can be achieved only through jnana or Self-realization. Purification of mind is a precondition for the rise of this jnana; and the yogas of karman, bhakti and dhyana are means towards this end. The Self, though seated in the perishable body, is eternal, unconcerned with actions which in fact belong to the prakrti with which the Self identifies himself through ignorance and, according their authorship to himself, plunges into samsara. The Self is distinct from the body and the various identities associated with the body are superimposed on it through ignorance. The concept of liberation presumes that of bondage which is the result of past actions accumulated though a chain of lives and deaths. The path of self-realization passes through a detached attitude towards worldly pleasures resulting in renunciation of actions identified as the root of bondage. Heaven is conceived to be varying with the size and quality of merit one accumulates, i. e., discriminative, and lasts only until the balance of merit is exhausted. Liberation, on the other hand, is conceived to be permanent and allows no element of discrimination. Unlike in examinations and jails, there are no classes or grades (A, B, C...) in liberation. If there be any, it will cease to be what it is conceived to be. It allows no ethical code for a jnanin who can continue to 'live' even after liberation, for liberation has nothing to do with death. This theory has its own logic and has been developed to the finest details through centuries by authors of outstanding scholarship. 'Ethical code for a liberated soul' is a contradiction in terms. Self-realization is trans-ethical as is categorically stated by the Upanishads.

Tilak's Superstructure and the Issues It Raises

When we check details of Tilak's concept of KY vis-a-vis these basics, we realize that, by accepting some and rejecting or modifying other elements of the Vedantic theory briefly stated above, he has landed himself in problems for which he has no solutions. The most conspicuous of his departures from the basics is that KY does not end, but starts, with the acquisition of jnana, and is an option for renunciation. To a question why he should practise KY once he has achieved its goal, jnana, Tilak's reply is 'for loka-samgraha', in consideration of the proper conduct of the society; for, as BG says, the common man follows the great. This stand leads to several questions:

  1. If KY is compulsory for a liberated man, is he really liberated?
  2. Is it logical to expect a liberated man to practise KY in consideration of the social conduct which, for him, is samsara, a net fabricated by ignorance?
  3. Is it logical to allow KY which is essentially ethics to override jnana which is trans-ethical?
  4. Is Tilak's theory supported by evidence acceptable in scientific dialogue?
  5. Does Tilak's understanding of jnana tally with that in Vedantic tradition?

Moksa vs Ethics

The concept of moksa in Vedanta which means a total dissolution of identity has no parallel in social thought which is nothing if not characterized by identities. The social thinker thinks of a man as distinct from other animals as also from men of different identities involving race, nation, province, caste, color, language, relations and so on. The Self as defined by Vedanta is pure consciousness free from all these and similar distinctions. The very concept of social duty, the protection and continuation of which is Tilak's major concern, is based on such distinctions. How is it relevant in a state where all such distinctions are denied? By its very nature, ethics is based on an awareness of, and for a sound conduct of the society. In other words, it belongs to the relational world. How can it go hand in hand with moksa which is the cessation of relations? For a pious man, there is a lot of difference between the water of the holy Ganga and the tap water. For a scientist, water is H2O whether from the Ganga or a tap. Scientific reality is indifferent to sentimental considerations, for the former is based on objective evidence, and the latter, on willed cognition.

The World of 'Willed Cognition'

What is 'willed cognition'? Established epistemology recognizes two categories of cognition: true or valid, and false or invalid. The cognition of a rope as a rope is true, that as a snake is false. These categories are so familiar that they hardly need an explanation. Although sufficient for explaining empirical experience, these categories cannot explain a vast area of our life called culture. Culture covers everything from plays to politics, language to literatures, religions to social institutions, love songs to national anthems, stickers to national flags, trade unions to nations, in fact, all that man has created on the basis of his will as against the physical world which exists irrespective man's will. In drama, we identify the actor with Hamlet on the strength of our will and enjoy it. The criterion for the willed nature of this experience is our awareness of the separate identities of the actor and Hamlet. In the example discussed above, the holiness of the Ganga water is a matter of will handed down by tradition and subsequently transformed into a belief. We know that language consists of words which are but sequences of sounds linked to certain senses by convention which is ultimately the will of the speakers. On the poetic level, we call a man a lion for his courage, knowing full well that the two are in fact different. We do lots of such identifications for aesthetic or similar purposes. When we are not aware of this difference, false cognition results, as, for example, when we recognize a rope as a snake. All values, social institutions, systems, conventions and the like are phenomena involving willed cognition. Traditional analysis of human experience which does not recognize willed cognition cannot be regarded as complete or final.

The Scientific and the Mythical Contents of the Vedanta

While classing ethics as the domain of willed cognition, I am aware that Vedantic works are full of mythical contents based on will. From various accounts of the creation of the world to a large number of meditational ways and devices, Vedanta texts abound in mythical contents. This necessitates an attempt to sift scientific content of Vedanta from the mythical one. Identity of the individual soul with the universal principle based on a scientific analysis of our states of consciousness - waking, dream and deep sleep is the main thesis of Vedanta, and it deserves our attention more than anything else as attested even by a great authority like Gaudapada. If physical sciences explore the outer, objective world, Vedanta explores the inner, subjective world. Vedanta, thus, is the science of the subject and follows the discipline of presentation of its results - hypotheses, evidence, conclusions - as much as do the physical sciences. That the nature of evidence in Vedanta differs from that of physical sciences is due to the difference in the nature of the subjects they treat of even among physical sciences, nature of evidence changes with that of the subject. Discoveries of Vedanta are not a matter of belief but of reality.

Values and Scientific Reality

This explains why ethics cannot be linked with scientific reality. What Tilak has done is to take the latter as the basis for the former, may be out of his keenness to find a basis for ethics in Indian philosophy which, by common consent, lacks ethical deliberations. This is mixing up willed cognition with true cognition. Values that make ethics are a matter of will which changes from time to time, place to place, and society to society. Scientific reality is the same for all. In Tilak's view, cognition of the ultimate reality forms the basis of Indian concept of social duty: How can our status in the world of everyday business form the basis of our behaviour in a drama or a dream? To come to details, how can Arjuna fight his adversaries with an outlook of equanimity towards friends and enemies which, according to BG, characterises an enlightened man? In the events that follow BG, he has behaved in the same manner as any normal warrior would. And Krishna, too, who has played all tricks a practical man would. What proof is there that they have done all this in the perfect manner of KY, i. e., in a detached manner not claiming or caring for the results? If events in the subsequent story are to be taken as indications, there is every reason to believe that the two were as normal as any man of the world. The only possible conclusion is that they were not enlightened in the Vedantic sense of the term, in case we treat the events and personalities associated with BG as historical.

Stories as Frameworks

But what if we do not? Stories in philosophical works are just frameworks meant for providing an occasion for the presentation of the teaching. They serve an ornamental purpose to induce the reader to read them. Many of such stories (e. g., the story of Naciketas and Yama in the Katha Upanisad) are obviously imaginary; and the rest are presumably so even though they involve characters which smack of historicity. In other words, they are myths created by will, and no myth can be entertained as a proof in scientific discussion. It follows from this that the example of Janaka cited in BG and taken as a support for post-enlightenment KY is no evidence.

The Test of Enlightenment

Then, what decides that a man is enlightened? Not certainly his affidavit. If such a proof is admissible, any man can make a claim to enlightenment. This is unscientific. It is the presence of the characteristics of the enlightened man which are described in BG and other Vedantic works and are logically linked to his state that decide whether or not a man is enlightened in the Vedantic sense. If Tilak's view is admitted, there would hardly be a man or woman of any profession including that of a sharebroker who cannot claim to be enlightened! Viewed from this angle, even Yajnavalkya, acclaimed to be the greatest philosopher of Upanishadic times, cannot be called enlightened, for he himself has confessed that he is not a brahmistha, but only gokama, and he had a large property to divide between his two wives. Admirers of recent great personalities like Vivekananda accord to them the honour of Vedantic enlightenment. This is not more than an indication of the appreciation of their great work and stands on an equal level with raising memorials of or naming streets after great men. Greatness or such other attributes have only a social significance which mean nothing for a man of enlightenment.

Jnana - Intellectual and Experiential

One wonders what led Tilak to base his ethics on Vedantic enlightenment? The term jnana, which according to Vedanta, is the only means to liberation has a number of connotations in different contexts even in Vedantic works. But when it is said to be the means of moksa, it means experience - saksatkara,as distinct from intellectual understanding or conviction. Despite his knowledge of this distinction indicated in his writing, Tilak seems to have taken this term in the latter sense (i. e., intellectual understanding) which does not militate against ethical considerations. The great teachers of Vedanta from Yajnavalkya to Vasudevashastri Abhyankar of our own times who were mostly householders and also great scholars who no doubt devoted their lives to teaching and writing on Vedanta, made no claim to enlightenment; and even if one did, such a claim would only contradict itself implying the existence of his ego which is a sure indication of his not being enlightened.

Conclusion

The discussion above reveals the weaknesses of Tilak's position if exposed to scientific criteria. Considering the scholarly potential of Tilak, are we not justified in saying that he would not have interpreted BG the way he did, had he not called upon to guide Indian people on the path of swarajya?

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